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This paper takes inspiration from the integrative model of human mind proposed by 
Brinkmann (2011, 2012) and argues that the kind of integration that he seeks to attain 
can only be achieved if the model focuses on the processes that underlie the functioning 
of the human mind and not on the entities that these processes produce or function by. 
An alternative integrative model is thus proposed. In the first part of the paper the 
process of meaning-making will be explored. It will be argued that an integrative 
conceptualisation of human mind needs to take into account pre-reflective and 
unmediated as well as reflective and mediated states through which meanings become 
constructed. In the second part of the paper the idea of semiotic mediation will be 
explored. It will be argued that an integrative model of human mind needs to focus not 
only on different kinds of mediators, but also explain how these are used reflectively 
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and non-reflectively by individuals themselves and visibly or invisibly by others in our 
everyday interactions.  
 




An interesting conceptual debate has recently unfolded on the pages of the journal IPBS: 
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science. The starting point of this debate is 
Svend Brinkmann’s (2011) article in which he develops a theory of the mind, 
conceptualising the mind as a set of skills and dispositions that is constituted by four 
sources of mediators: the brain, body, social practices and technological artefacts. He 
suggests that human mind should be understood as normative, for mental processes do 
not merely happen but are performed by human beings.  
In their commentary Alfredo Gaete and Carlos Cornejo (2012) criticize 
Brinkmann’s position on two grounds. First, they argue that by advocating a position 
where mind is understood as a set of skills and dispositions, Brinkmann neglects 
conscious experience as fundamental to the mind; humans, they argue, do not only 
actively perform but also undergo certain experiences. Second, they are not impressed 
by Brinkmann’s usage of the concept of mediation, for in their view, this concept does 
not add anything to Brinkmann’s conceptualisation of the mind as dispositional and 
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therefore already having materiality, and is not sufficiently explained in relation to 
Brinkmann’s four types of mediators.  
In this paper I take this debate about mind and mediation as a starting point for 
my own reflections on these themes. In the first part of the paper I will extend the 
original debate about the mind as undergoing conscious experiences or as performing 
certain skills by introducing the idea that mind is first and foremost a set of skills and 
dispositions for making meanings. I will show how foregrounding the mind’s capacity 
to create abstract and generalised meanings will enable to overcome the divide between 
Brinkmann and Gaete and Cornejo’s positions. In the second part of the paper I will 
return to the main focus of Brinkmann’s (2011) contribution – mediated human 
perception and action – and continue unpacking the conceptualisation of human mind as 
a meaning-making system that is socially and culturally mediated by exploring the 
concept of semiotic mediation. I will extend Brinkmann’s integration by placing his 
different mediators in relation to the different ways our experiencing is mediated by our 
being embedded in structures of social relations and practices. 
 
On mind and meaning-making 
Mind as a set of skills and dispositions 
The starting point of Brinkmann’s argument is his distinction between two 
conceptualisations of human mind: one, where mind is seen as an independent entity 
that does certain things, and second, where the performative powers are attributed to the 
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humans who have certain skills and dispositions that are referred to by using the 
concept of the mind. Brinkmann (2011) himself advocates the latter position: “we 
should reject the widespread tendency in psychology to reify the mind by treating it as 
an independent entity, which does certain things (attends, remembers etc.). The mind 
does not do these things. Persons do such things, and it is exactly their capacities, 
abilities, capabilities, and dispositions to do these things that we refer to with the term 
‘mind’” (p. 5). For Brinkmann, then, the mind as a term is itself a construction of 
human mind – a ‘useful fiction’ that enables us to look at our phenomenon of interest 
from a particular conceptual position (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2011, p. 7).  
Brinkmann (2012) argues that when human mind is conceptualised as a set of 
skills and dispositions that humans have and use to conduct their lives then we can start 
to talk about psychological phenomena that “do not merely happen, but rather are done, 
exercised, performed” (p. 79). And because psychological phenomena (differently from 
physiological) do not simply happen, but are performed by humans, he argues, they are 
“subject to normative and indeed moral appraisal” (Brinkmann, 2011, p. 4).  
It is this idea, that humans always use their capabilities and dispositions, i.e., 
their mind, to actively do something and perform particular acts of feeling, thinking and 
behaviour that is picked up by Gaete and Cornejo (2012) in their commentary. For they 
argue that psychological phenomena, such as feeling dread or anger (an example that 
Brinkmann borrows from Harré and develops in his article), are precisely the kind of 
conscious experiences that indeed happen to human beings. That is, they are things that 
human beings undergo and not things they actively do or perform. Gaete and Cornejo 
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argue that they are “not the activities of an agent, but rather things that happen to a 
subject – in such a way that it would be odd to describe any particular action or activity 
performed by a person as, say, her dread or anger” (p. 72). Instead they suggest that 
“[p]erceiving is not a matter of performing an action or activity but of undergoing a 
certain experience” (p. 72). Gaete and Cornejo do agree with Brinkmann that things can 
be heard or seen more or less skilfully, but they nevertheless maintain that perceiving or 
undergoing a conscious experience as such should be distinguished from these skilful 
performances. That is, it is possible and necessary to conceptualise mind also as a 
“capacity to undergo conscious experiences”, for “the capacity to undergo conscious 
experiences is certainly not a set of skills, and conscious experiences are not 
performances or undergoings” (p. 72).  
Two opposite philosophical positions are thus brought into dialogue by this 
scholarly exchange. In fact, in his response to Gaete and Cornejo’s commentary 
Brinkmann (2012) accuses his critics of “implicitly bringing to life a kind of empiricism 
that should have been dead and buried at least since Immanuel Kant” (p. 81). He 
maintains that the kind of conscious experiences or undergoings that his critics talk 
about are “possible only on the background of skilful human activity” (p. 80) and adds 
that “we should have learned from phenomenological, Gestalt, pragmatist, and 
ecological schools of psychology […] that perception from the outset is disclosing a 
rich world of normative values and meanings, and that it does so exactly because it is 
not passive and spectator-like, but a function of the activities of persons that act in a 
changing world” (p. 81).  
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Although I do agree with Brinkmann that the non-empiricist traditions cannot be 
overlooked when offering a contemporary conceptualisation of human mind, I do not 
think that his strategy of repeating and not advancing the ideas of such classics as 
Dewey or Merleau-Ponty, helps us to say something current and progressive about the 
human mind. Instead I would suggest that we have better chances of accomplishing this 
task if we add the ideas about human psychological functioning that have recently been 
developed and proposed by sociocultural or dialogical scholars (see for example Linell 
2009; Märtsin, Wagoner, Aveling, Kadianaki & Whittaker, 2011; Valsiner, 2012) to the 
debate that Brinkman and Gaete and Cornejo have opened up.  
 
Mind as a capacity to make meanings 
In order to propose such a conceptualisation of human mind, a characteristically and 
exclusively human capacity needs to be foregrounded. As humans we conduct our lives 
in cultural worlds. That is, we live in the worlds of signs and meanings. As Valsiner 
(2012) writes: “We – as persons within our social contexts – create signs and use them 
to regulate ourselves and others. We are not “members of a culture” (read – social group 
or nation – as is assumed in cross-cultural psychology), but culture – in terms of 
semiosis – is part of our psyche” (p. xii). The term ‘mind’ thus refers specifically to 
those skills and capabilities that humans use to create and use signs and to communicate 
with themselves and with other individuals through the use of meanings. My 
understanding of human mind is thus similar to that of Linell (2009) who writes: “A 
mind is a sense-making system, which is (partly) conscious of its own sense-making” (p. 
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12). Moreover, I agree with him when he says that dialogical perspective directs our 
attention towards conceptualising human mind as ‘social’ or ‘extended’: “No human 
being is autonomous from others; on the contrary, we are strongly interdependent with 
others. Other people and many artefacts like computers, contribute to our activities of 
making sense in and of the world” (Linell, 2009, p. 12). It is this conceptualisation of 
human mind as a meaning-making system that is extended and guided through its 
mutual connections and interdependency with other humans and cultural artefacts that I 
want to emphasise and unpack in this paper with reference to the debate between 
Brinkmann and Gaete and Cornejo.  
 
Undergoings of the mind and affective semiosis. It seems to me that when Gaete and 
Cornejo talk about individuals undergoing certain experiences they are referring to the 
immediate living experiences of human beings as they face the ever-new moments with 
their abundance of environmental stimuli in the infinite sequence of irreversible time 
(Valsiner, 2007a). Bergson (2005; see also Muldoon, 2006) has argued that the 
indivisible and irreversible flow of our consciousness is always connected to the world 
that is in the process of becoming something else. In other words, in irreversible flow of 
time we can never encounter two situations that are exactly the same, but the situations 
are always new, unique and specific. Yet somehow human mind manages to regulate 
this over-abundance of ever-new stimuli. That is, we do not live in the world where 
everything feels completely new to us all the time, but rather, our world feels familiar, 
understandable and even predictable. And so it is this capability to regulate the over-
 8 
abundance of environmental stimuli that highlights and foregrounds uniquely human 
meaning-making capacities, for the regulation and temporary stabilisation of this 
‘lurking chaos of experiencing ever-new moments’ (Valsiner, 2007a, p. 301) is achieved 
through the creation of semiotic devices of various kinds. It is through the creation of 
signs – dynamic fusions of form and meaning (Kress, 2010) – that two essentially 
different experiences can be rendered similar and thus made sense of as the same 
experience. It is through the creation of signs that the ever-new world starts to feel 
understandable, familiar and predictable. The situations remain unique and 
fundamentally different, yet they can be likened and connected to each other if the same 
meaning is attached to them. For example, the constant crying of a newborn baby and 
her being very quiet can easily mean the same thing for the new mother – namely that 
there is something wrong with the baby. Meanings thus go beyond the specific 
situations from which they emerged and in this abstract and generalised form can be 
used in other contexts in the future. 
Abbey (2007) talks about human mind as having semiotic architecture. That is, 
through our engagement with the world and its abundance of stimuli we construct 
meanings that differ in their level of abstraction and generalisation. According to 
Valsiner (2007b) at the lowest level of experiencing no semiotic mediation takes place, 
but rather non-mediated ‘feeling tones’ as ‘anticipatory affective states’ that allow us to 
orient ourselves to something that is about to happen are experienced (p. 313). It is to 
this lowest level of experiencing the over-abundance of environmental stimuli – to the 
level of general affective orientation towards the environmental stimuli – is where I 
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would thus place the experiences that Gaete and Cornejo talk about. At this lowest level, 
the experiences can be seen as merely happening to us. We simply undergo a range of 
experiences at this very first level of encountering our surrounding world. However, I 
would be reluctant to call those experiences conscious as Gaete and Cornejo do, but 
would rather follow the theorising of Salvatore and Venuleo (2008, 2010) who argue 
that we need to distinguish between two ways of meaning-making – uncounscious and 
conscious or affective and rational. 
According to Salvatore and Venuleo, unconscious and conscious semiosis are 
based on different modes of working. Building on the works of Chilean psychoanalyst 
Ignacio Matte Blanco they propose that unconscious or affective semiosis works on the 
basis of symmetry principle which homogenises experiences and renders them identical. 
For Salvatore and Venuleo (2010), unconscious thought is a generalizing way of 
signifying, “an absolutely undifferentiated, presymbolic field of activation, produced by 
the encounter between the mind and the world, where no distinction has yet been made” 
(p. 61). In contrast, conscious or rational semiosis is based on the asymmetry principle 
that introduces heterogeneity and difference into our experience. They write: 
“asymmetric thought starts from and works upon the presymbolic field, making 
differentiations there that lead to the first proto-categories and therefore the first forms 
of experience” (ibid.). Rational thought thus differentiates our presymbolic fields of 
experiencing into meaningful categories, creating difference between and sameness 
within those categories.  
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In my interpretation then, Gaete and Cornejo’s undergoings of the mind are 
precisely those undifferentiated and presymbolic states of activation at the lowest level 
of affective experiencing that Salvatore and Venuleo talk about in terms of unconscious 
semiosis. That is, they are those moments of experiencing where our mind is aware and 
aroused by an experience, but we have not yet made sense of that experience, i.e. are not 
yet sure what we are experiencing. True, the example of dread and anger that Gaete and 
Cornejo use in their article, does not fit with what I have just said, for when we know 
that we are feeling dread or anger, we have already moved higher up in the levels of 
experiencing and differentiated it into pockets that have a meaning and a name. Yet as 
far as their “conscious undergoings or experiences” are interpreted as presymbolic states 
of awareness, I do see them fitting with the conceptualisation of the mind that I have 
proposed here building on Salvatore and Venuleo’s work. Yet, there is also another way, 
another level of experiencing that we must consider when talking about purely affective 
states of mind. 
 
Undergoings of the mind and hyper-generalisation. As Salvatore and Venuleo 
describe, our experiencing of the world unfolds through a complementary working of 
unconscious and conscious thought, where the former generalises and homogenises our 
encounter with the ever-new and over-abundant environmental stimuli, while the latter 
differentiates and heterogenises our experiences. In the meaning-making then, the 
undifferentiated affective field becomes differentiated through person’s reflection upon 
that initial unarticulated feeling and signified by a suitable sign. This is the initial state 
 11 
of awareness that we feel something that gets signified by the label ‘I am angry’. At the 
next level of abstraction, reflection upon the initial reflection again differentiates the 
field and then shrinks it into another more abstract sign. Through reflection we come to 
the conclusion that the person who has caused us grief does not deserve our anger, and 
so we rather feel sorry or pity towards him. Valsiner (2006) talks about this process of 
reaching ever increasing levels of abstraction as unfolding through the parallel 
processes of pleromatisation (creating difference into the field of experience) and 
schematisation (shrinking the experience into a abstracted meaning or pocket of 
similarity). The process of abstractive generalisation – creation of increasingly abstract 
signs that can be generalised to increasingly large variety of contexts – thus unfolds and 
a hierarchical structure of individual’s inner meaning field becomes constructed. In this 
hierarchical organisation the creation of new signs is spontaneously and automatically 
regulated by highly abstract and generalized metasigns. As Valsiner (2007b) suggests: 
“The human mind is regulated through a dynamic hierarchy of semiotic mechanisms of 
increasingly generalized kind, which involves mutual constraining between levels of the 
hierarchy” (p. 1). Regulation (simultaneous constraining and enabling) of sign 
construction, proliferation and termination thus works upwards in the sign hierarchy, for 
abstractive generalisation is rooted in and guided by the initial signification of the 
affective field, but also downwards, for higher order signs can re-direct or block the 
process of abstractive generalisation.  
Valsiner (2007a) suggests that in this semiotic hierarchy of our inner meaning 
field we can find purely affective and undifferentiated experiences on two levels – the 
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lowest level and the highest level. According to his theorising both our pre-reflective 
and non-mediated thought and our hyper-generalised or over-reflective thought are 
described by the state of speechlessness, that is, by the inability to name and articulate 
what it is that we are experiencing. Think for example about the overwhelming feeling 
of gratitude, beauty and happiness when looking at the peacefully sleeping newborn 
baby, and Valsiner’s suggestions about over-reflective affective states become clear (see 
also Märtsin, 2010). 
It seems to me that when Gaete and Cornejo talk about mind undergoing certain 
experiences they are mostly referring to our pre-reflective experiences or non-mediated 
states of affective orientation to the surrounding world. Nevertheless, the 
conceptualisation of human mind as meaning-making system described above allows us 
to extend their proposal to talk about humans undergoing experiences not only in terms 
of those states of experiencing when we do not yet know what we are encountering, but 
also those that emerge when we have over-generalised our experience to the point 
where all we are left with is an overwhelming sensation that cannot be put into words.  
 
Skilful performances and reflective thought. In between these two levels of affective 
experiencing are all those ways of experiencing of the world that involve some form of 
reflection or conscious thought. It is to these levels of reflective and conscious 
experiencing that I would place the skilful performances that Brinkmann talks about. 
For example, deciding to feel sorry and not angry towards someone who has hurt us and 
acting accordingly is such a reflective performance that can be assessed normatively and 
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deemed more or less suitable. And yet, if Brinkmann’s ideas about mind as a set of 
skills and dispositions can fit into the same theoretical framework that accommodates 
Gaete and Cornejo’s ideas about mind as merely undergoing experiences then why does 
he insist that they are contrary to his?  
To answer this question we need to return to Brinkmann’s suggestion that 
human being in and experiencing of the world is always intentional and therefore 
always subject to normative and moral appraisal. He writes: “mind is a set of skills and 
dispositions to act, think and feel, which can be assessed normatively” (Brinkmann, 
2011, p. 6). Following phenomenological thought he extends the intentionality of 
human experience towards the bodily habits and experiences we have of the world. 
When writing about “the body as a mediator of our experience of a meaningful world”, 
he suggests that: “the basic form of intentionality is found in the motility of the body”. 
Hence, although our first bodily experiences of the world might be pre-reflective, the 
body’s motility already assures their basic form of “operative intentionality” (p. 11). 
That is, because our bodies “can do” certain things then intentionality is built into our 
every move and act in the world, albeit sometimes in a habitual or elementary manner. 
At the same time, however, Brinkmann (2011) also writes: “In order to understand the 
mind fully, we […] also need to include a perspective on those social practices that 
provide the normative frameworks in which bodies move, act and suffer. For the bodies 
that mediate the mind as a set of skills and dispositions are able to do so only within 
social practices” (p. 12, emphasis added). It thus seems that on the one hand, 
Brinkmann separates intentionality and reflection, for there can be pre-reflective bodily 
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experiences of the world that are characterised by operative intentionality, albeit 
elementary and habitual. On the other hand however, he recognises that bodily habits in 
and of themselves cannot be rendered subject to moral appraisal without them being 
embedded in and related to certain social and cultural practices. It thus seems to me that 
Brinkmann does recognise the existence of pre-reflective undergoings of the kind that 
Gaete and Cornejo talk about. These mental states that are created through our bodily 
encounters with the world may be intentional in some kind of basic and elementary 
manner, but they can definitely not be rendered subject to moral and normative 
appraisal in the same manner as our reflective acts are. Or put differently, the moment 
they are rendered subject to the moral normativity of our culture, they are not anymore 
the kinds of affective undergoings that I have discussed here building on Gaete and 
Cornejo’s contribution, for mediation and reflective thought has already started to work 
upon them.  
My discussion so far has sought to show how the emphasis on the process of 
meaning-making allows integrating Brinkmann’s ideas about mind with those 
advocated by Gaete and Cornejo. The idea of semiotic mediation has been central to 
that discussion and thus it is now time to take a closer look at that idea.  
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On mind and mediation 
Mind as constituted by different mediators 
Whilst proposing to conceptualise human mind as a set of skills and dispositions, 
Brinkmann (2011) also seeks to offer an integrative model of human mind by bringing 
together different ways in which the mind can exercise its capabilities. In order to 
achieve that goal Brinkmann’s model centres on four sources of mediators – brain, body, 
social practices and technological artefacts – that are seen as “resources that we may use 
to communicate, cooperate and construct things together, but [that] are not simply 
intermediaries that transport without transforming”(Brinkmann, 2011, p. 6). Brinkmann 
argues that his conceptualisation of mind as extended through various kinds of 
mediators does not only counter the immateriality of human mind, but is also “meant to 
direct our attention to the many different kinds of mediators that are needed for the 
skills of the mind to be exercised” (Brinkmann, 2012, p. 85).  
Yet it is precisely this integration of different kinds of mediators that gets picked 
up and criticised by Gaete and Cornejo (2012). They write: “We do not gain very much 
by describing the body as a mediator if we do not describe the way in which it mediates 
a person’s action upon the world […]. Even if we accept, for the sake of argument, that 
bodies, social practices and artefacts are mediators, the ways in which each of them 
mediate is so different that it is not clear that we have a unitary concept operating here” 
(Gaete & Cornejo, 2012, p. 6). Unfortunately Gaete and Cornejo do not extend these 
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comments by explaining how mediation can indeed work in different ways. And 
without the need to address any concrete criticism Brinkmann (2012) can merely state 
in his response that the development of this kind will “be in focus in future work” (p. 
85).   
In this second part of the paper I want to extend Gaete and Cornejo’s criticism 
and take a closer look at the different ways in which our perception and action in the 
world is mediated. More specifically, I want to look more closely at the concept of 
semiotic mediation and consider it in relation to social practices – that is, what is being 
mediated, by whom, to whom and for what purposes through our being embedded in 
structures of social relations. 
 
Mind as semiotically mediated 
In theorising mediation as a process of distancing and approaching Del Rio (2002) has 
suggested that humans use cultural mediators for redirecting their gaze and learning to 
see that which is ‘invisible’ for the uncultured eye. He writes: “Through this cultural 
process of re-learning to see, the child manages to master the perceptive environment – 
which at first, as in animals, imposes itself upon him or her – through the use of external 
psychological and semiological instruments, and then through internal ones, directed 
towards him- or herself. Put another way, perceiving and acting in a cultural context – 
densely mediated – is impossible unless we learn to make at least minimal use of 
mediations” (p. 238). Del Rio’s theorising thus points to the idea, that although human 
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mind can be extended into the world in different ways we need to place special 
emphasis on semiotic mediation. Referring to Vygotsky’s theorising, Bakhurst (2007) 
further argues that the construction of psychological devices or signs more generally 
lies in the mastery of social practices: “We owe our very mindedness, our personhood, 
to our appropriation of culture, and our mental lives are lived in communication and 
activity with others, either directly or through the mediation of culture. Education in the 
broadest sense makes us what we are” (p. 56).  
Interestingly, this special emphasis on semiotic mediation through social 
practices is not obvious in the model that is proposed by Brinkmann. Instead, social 
practices are depicted as one type of mediators amongst many. It has to be 
acknowledged that Brinkmann is not alone in trying to integrate such diverse elements 
of the world as bodies, social practices and technology into a single conceptual 
framework of mediation. Linell (2009), for example, has also proposed that our mind is 
extended towards the world via four different forms of mediation: 1) perceptual 
mediation that focuses on our senses and bodies that have their limitations and 
potentials that allow us to perceive the world in certain ways; 2) practical mediation that 
covers the practical handling of objects in the world; 3) linguistic and other kinds of 
semiotic mediation, that highlight our capacities to reconstruct the world by using 
language and other sign systems; and 4) artefact-based mediation that refers to modern 
technologies that provide us with knowledge and information that would be impossible 
to acquire and use merely with our bodies, senses or languages. The similarities 
between Brinkmann’s and Linell’s typologies are obvious, for both are based on the 
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elements of the world (e.g. brain, senses, body, technology) that enable mediation. 
However, Brinkmann goes a step further by arguing that the four sources of mediation 
are interconnected.  
In Brinkmann’s model the four mediators are depicted as layers, with brain 
being the innermost layer, followed by body, social practices and ending with 
technological artefacts as the outermost layer. When explaining the interconnections 
between these layers, Brinkmann (2011) writes: “As the brain needs a living body in 
order to function as a mediator of psychological acts, so the body needs social practices 
to socialize it and its habits, just as sociality in the human sense needs technological 
artefacts in order for social relationships to be sufficiently stabilized so that human 
societies can emerge” (p. 3). Brinkmann explains that although the mediators appear to 
be inside each other as Russian dolls in his model, this aspect of his model should only 
be taken in a metaphorical manner for he is first and foremost interested in depicting the 
ways different mediators stabilize and structure each other.  
Having acknowledged that the terms “contain”, “inside” and “outside” should be 
used only in metaphorical sense, it is still worth considering how Brinkmann depicts the 
interconnections between his four mediators and especially how brains, bodies and 
technologies are connected to social practices. In his model, the social practices do not 
seem to be the ones that “contain” the other forms of mediators, but instead they are 
placed “outside” of brains and bodies, but “inside” technological artefacts. In proposing 
this kind of layering, Brinkmann refers to Latour’s (2005) insistence that it is 
meaningful to talk about “the social” only as far as it is understood as something that is 
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‘kept together’ materially or technologically. Brinkmann (2011) writes: “technologies in 
a metaphorical sense “contain” the social and its norms by stabilizing them […] the 
social norms similarly stabilize or structure bodily acts and habits […] the body finally 
contains the brain and gives meaning to human experience” (p. 3). However, what 
Brinkmann fails to explain is how the materiality of technologies is different from the 
materiality of brains and bodies when it comes to ‘keeping together’ or ‘stabilizing’ the 
social and cultural. Or approaching the same issue from the opposite direction, how it is 
that sociality is needed to keep together (in the sense of ordering, shaping, giving 
meaning to) bodily habits, but is not needed to keep together the use of technological 
artefacts. For this is precisely what Brinkmann seems to suggest when he places brain 
and body “within” social practices, while depicting technologies as “external” to these. 
It seems to me that while it makes sense to talk about the social and cultural only as far 
as these are kept together by the material, it also makes sense to talk about mediation by 
technology only as far as the social and cultural aspect of this mediation are recognised. 
Brinkmann (2011) writes: “Almost all forms of human interaction involve technologies 
and artefacts. We can “uphold” relations between us, so to speak, without close 
interactions, because we have buildings, institutions, infrastructure, databases, 
parliaments and numerous other things” (p. 15). It is indeed true that once created 
technologies and institutions allow us to uphold our relations and sometimes also guide 
the development of these towards outcomes that were not initially intended. For 
example, one needs to look no further than our classrooms to see how schools as 
institutions often reproduce instead of eliminating social inequalities. Yet it still seems 
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to me that the creation of various institutions, technologies and artefacts in the first 
place and the continuous usage of them require the existence of the close interactions 
between humans for which they were initially created for. The fact that mainstream 
schools nowadays often fail certain groups of students does not nullify the idea of 
creating schools as institutions in the first place, but rather hihglights how schools need 
to change as the societal relations and practices change. As such, social practices and 
technologies are not connected unidirectional, but are mutually constitutive – an aspect 
that seems to get lost in Brinkmann’s model.  
But the point that I am trying to make here goes beyond the pecularities of 
Brinkmann’s spatial model. In my reading, Brinkmann suggests that different elements 
of the world become part of our mind; they become part of who we are and what we can 
do. Yet what is missing from his model is an explanation how this “becoming part of” 
occurs – i.e. what is the process through which brains, bodies, social practices and 
technology start to work as extensions through which we can exercise our skills and 
dispositions. Put differently, he seems to acknowledge that our meaning-making 
capacities are significantly expanded by our uptake and usage of things, but fails to 
place this assertion in relation to the idea that we become meaning-making creatures in 
the first place through our connections with other humans and through our being 
embedded in shared social practices. That is, we become creatures who can render their 
world familiar and manageable by creating ever-more abstract and generalised signs 
only if we receive the initial input for it from others. I thus believe that Brinkmann’s 
aim of integrating various mediators into one single model would be better achieved if 
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he would link all his different mediators to the central concept of semiotic mediation 
and to the different ways semiotic mediation works. It is this idea that semiotic 
mediation can work in different ways that I want to explore further now.  
 
Many manifestations of semiotic mediation   
So how does semiotic mediation work? What are the different ways we learn to use the 
tools and signs that are available in our culture to perceive and act in the world? How do 
we become meaning-making creatures that can make sense of their experiences in a 
manner that is ordinary in a particular culture?  
Recognising that most of our experiencing in the world is semiotically mediated 
and acknowledging that we learn to construct and manage meanings in order to use 
various things to extend our skills and capabilities through our engagement with others 
in social practices, does not mean that all our mediated perception and action is 
intentional and reflective. For example, Gillespie and Zittoun (2010) argue that 
Vygotsky’s (1978) famous distinction between action upon the world using tools and 
action upon the mind using signs, has to be extended, for both of these ways of using 
mediators can be either reflective or non-reflective. In the former case the focus of 
action is the tool or sign and its use, whilst in the latter case the focus is on the goal of 
the action and not the means through which it is achieved.  
Whilst Gillespie and Zittoun’s focus in understanding the process of mediation 
is intra-individual (that is, the person is working on her relation to the world or to her 
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own mind), it should also be considered how individuals use tools and signs to work on 
the minds of others. Hasan (2004) has proposed to conceptualise semiotic mediation as 
a process of “mediation by someone of something to someone by means of acts of 
meaning, typically by the modality of language, which entails a structure of socio-
cultural relations” (p. 33). Hasan thus adopts an inter-personal perspective when seeking 
to understand how semiotic mediation works and is thus useful for us in order to unpack 
how culture becomes transmitted to and taken up by the individuals in the first place.  
 
Visible and invisible mediation. Similarly to Wertsch’s (2007) distinction between 
implicit and explicit semiotic mediation, Hasan (2004) differentiates between two 
manifestations of semiotic mediation: “one mode that mediates mental dispositions, 
habits of the mind or typical ways of responding to situations, and one that targets some 
specific concept, some element of some vertical knowledge structure” (p. 39). She 
refers to those two manifestations as invisible and visible mediation, respectively. In the 
case of visible semiotic mediation the interaction is ‘visibly’ focussed on a specific 
concept or problem and both parties are clear what is the goal of their interaction, with 
at least one of them acting consciously in the role of the teacher and the other paying 
attention to their joint activity. In contrast, in the case of invisible mediation, it is not 
clear to either party what is being mediated or what the goal of their interaction is, for 
individuals simply engage in everyday interaction. The distinction Hasan (2002) thus 
draws is between a teacher explaining the concept of infinity to his students and 
conversation a mother has with her five-year-old daughter as they are cooking dinner.   
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Hasan (2004) argues that although in the case of invisible mediation it is not 
immediately clear that any transmission of culture is going on, important elements of 
mental dispositions, identities and practices are still being mediated in those situations. 
Similarly, Bakhurst (2007), referring again to Vygotsky’s theorising, argues that the 
repertoire of concepts and forms of thought ordinarily available in a culture is hardly 
ever “explicitly taught to the child; [instead] she “picks it up” through her engagement 
in various practices that are, of course, initiated or scaffolded by caregivers” (p. 72). 
Hasan (2004) and Bakhurst (2007) thus suggest that invisible semiotic mediation is 
effective in creating certain mental skills, dispositions or habits of the mind exactly 
because it is normal and ordinary. That is, we learn to perceive and act in the world in a 
manner that is typical, normal and accepted in our culture precisely because the cultural 
ways of perceiving and acting are commonplace and indisputable to the degree that they 
becomes invisible. In Hasan’s (2002) own words: “This does not mean that culture is 
irrelevant to these encounters; it is simply that it goes underground: sayings that pertain 
to everyday activities and seem to be ‘of no great importance’ depend largely on taken-
for-granted 'truths' whose validity is treated as self-evident” (p. 116).  
It is this idea of culture going ‘underground’ and being ‘invisible’ but still 
incredibly powerful in shaping who we are and what we can do in the world that, in my 
view, needs to be placed at the centre of any model of human mind. It is true that when 
talking about mediation, Brinkmann (2011) does recognise that mediation can indeed 
work in different ways. For example, he refers to Gillespie and Zittoun’s (2010) 
distinction between reflective and non-reflective use of mediators and argues that body 
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can be seen as a tool that is ordinarily used non-reflectively. But taking the intra-
personal perspective and looking at the reflectivity and intentionality only from that 
point of view is, in my view, not sufficient for understanding how semiotic mediation 
works. By introducing here Hasan’s (2002, 2004) ideas about visible and invisible 
semiotic mediation I have sought to argue that in understanding how mind becomes 
extended into the world entails not only an account of how individuals themselves use 
tools and signs to work on their worlds and minds, but equally requires an explanation 
how different mediators are used by others to work on the minds of others. For it is only 
when we understand how culture becomes invisibly transmitted in our ordinary 
everyday interactions and how our social positions in the world come to impact the 
ways in which we perceive and act in the world that we can start to understand how we 
become meaning-making creatures that can perform certain acts of thinking, feeling and 
behaving in the world.  
 
Concluding remarks 
My aim in this paper has been similar to that of Brinkmann – to offer an integrative 
model of human mind. In the first part of the paper I sought to achieve this by arguing 
that human perception and action in the world covers pre-reflective and unmediated as 
well as reflective and mediated states and that both of these need to be taken into 
account in an integrative model of human mind. In the second part of the paper I 
concentrated on the idea of semiotic mediation  and proposed that an integrative model 
of human mind needs to focus not only on different kinds of mediators, but also explain 
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how these are used reflectively and non-reflectively by individuals themselves and 
visibly or invisibly by others in our everyday interactions.  
Sawyer (2002) has suggested that socioculturalism has two foundational 
theoretical assumptions: inseparability of individual and social levels of analysis and 
process ontology of the social world. The latter, he writes, “holds that only processes 
are real; entities, structures or patterns are ephemeral and do not really exist” (p. 283). 
My aim in unpacking the processes of meaning-making and semiotic mediation in this 
paper and through that offering an integrative model of human mind has thus followed 
the idea that we can only understand the many fascinating manifestations of the mind’s 
work if we concentrate on the underlying processes that cover all that multiplicity and 
diversity. And although I have written this paper with the aim of integration, I do realise 
that some of the proposed ideas need further assembling. For example, the connections 
between reflective/non-reflective and visible/invisible mediation could be explored 
further. Equally, the dialogical nature of communication and the mutuality of meaning-
making in interpersonal encounters could be further developed in relation to the 
proposed model. These routes of further work refer to the need to connect the intra-
personal and inter-personal levels of analysis. And whilst there are many ways of doing 
that, the research that develops this model further should undeniably focus on the study 
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